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ABSTRACT 
HEDGING EMERGING MARKET BONDS AND THE RISE OF 
THE CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP 
 
 
On October 5, 2001, when credit spreads were widening, the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange CME de-listed the full menu of emerging market Brady bond futures 
contracts. This is intriguing because at a time when interest in hedging and 
speculating in emerging market sovereign credit risk should be at its peak, the CME 
de-listed precisely the sort of contract designed to hedge and speculate in sovereign 
credit risk. This paper finds statistical evidence suggesting that the developing over 
the counter CDS contract acted as a substitute product for the Brady bond futures 
contract thereby undermining the Brady bond futures contract and contributing to its 
demise. 
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HEDGING EMERGING MARKET BONDS AND THE RISE OF THE 
CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the mid 1990’s investors could hedge and speculate on emerging market debt by 
trading in Brady bond futures contracts. In total there were six futures contracts 
written on Brady bonds issued by Argentina, Brazil and Mexico and were traded on 
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange CME. Yet on October 5, 2001, when emerging 
market credit spreads were widening, these six CME futures contracts ceased to trade. 
This is intriguing since one would suppose that these contracts would be most in 
demand at times of great uncertainty. For instance Figure 1 shows that on the day that 
these futures contracts were withdrawn, the medium term (7 to 10 year) yield spread 
over the 10 year on the run US Treasury note of the US dollar denominated bonds of 
Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela and Mexico widened to almost 5,000, 1,000, 500 and 
200 basis points respectively.  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
  
According to Black’s (1986) model one reason why a futures contract can fail is the 
availability of an alternative hedging instrument. Nothaft, Lekkas and Wang (1995) 
find that the existence of an alternative hedging instrument is associated with the 
demise of the mortgage backed futures contract. The purpose of this paper is to 
present evidence that the rise of the maturing credit default swap CDS market may 
have contributed to the demise of the exchange traded Brady futures contracts by 
forming a superior hedging alternative to the menu of Brady bond futures contracts.  
 
In fact this paper clearly demonstrates that indeed CDS contracts can perform better 
as a hedging instrument than the exchange traded Brady bond futures contract. A 
statistical test conducted in an out of sample framework is applied to a group of 
actively quoted bonds to determine if apparent improvements in hedging effectiveness 
are significant. In the first half of the sample CDS contracts yield statistically 
significant superior hedge performance for only three of the twelve emerging market 
bonds that are hedged. In contrast in the second half of the sample CDS contracts 
yield statistically significant superior hedge performance for eight of twelve bonds. 
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This suggests that the hedge performance of the CDS contract improved over time 
cutting into the main raison de être of the Brady bond futures contracts. Eventually 
the CME realised that hedgers and speculators in emerging market debt would not 
return to the exchange and so withdrew the Brady bond futures contracts on October 
5, 2001. 
 
These results have three implications. First they illustrate that the developing CDS 
market improved the effectiveness of hedging Sovereign risk to the point where 
exchange traded futures contracts specifically designed to tackle this problem were 
made redundant. Secondly, it demonstrates that exchange traded products face 
competition with innovations in the less transparent over the counter market. Thirdly, 
these findings point the way for the exchange traded futures market to respond to such 
competition. Specifically, an exchange traded CDS futures contract can trade based on 
an average of surveyed values of over the counter CDS contracts. This possibility is 
not merely hypothetical as already the two, five and ten year interest rate swap and the 
one-month Libor futures contracts are trading on this basis on the CME. 
 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. The first section reviews the Brady 
bond and the CDS market literature and explains the rationale for developing the 
emerging market Brady bond futures contract. Section II discusses the data and 
Section III discusses the methodology. Section IV presents and discusses the 
empirical results while section V concludes. 
 
2. THE BRADY BOND AND CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP MARKETS 
 
Periodically the world’s financial system is shaken by large sovereign bank loan 
defaults obligating bailouts by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, 
often in co-operation with OECD countries.  In 1989, the US Treasury secretary 
Michael Brady sought a market-based solution by designing a tradable financial 
contract that the defaulted sovereign and their creditors could accept as a substitute for 
defaulted sovereign bank loans. The idea is to substitute defaulted US dollar bank 
loans with a new market traded bond denominated in US dollars. Although the 
sovereign is always fully responsible for repayment of interest and principal in a 
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timely manner, sometimes credit risk is reduced because some portion of the bond is 
defeased by U.S. Treasury zero-coupon bonds.   
 
There are two main types of Brady bonds, par and discount bonds. Par bonds are 
Brady bonds that replace banks loans at face value but pay below market value 
interest. Discount bonds replace bank loans at below face value but pay market rates 
of interest. Therefore both types of Brady bonds involve some economic loss to the 
original lender but in return the original lender is able to sell the bonds and remove 
the loans from their balance sheet. 1  
 
This innovation proved popular and “Brady bonds” became the preferred debt 
instrument used to bail out many Sovereigns in financial difficulty.  Soon these Brady 
bonds developed many innovations of their own such as floating coupon payment 
bonds and were often denominated in other major currencies such as pounds sterling, 
euros and yen. Investors were interested in these bonds as these instruments allowed 
them to add sovereign risk to their portfolios. In turn however, this led to the demand 
for a Brady bond hedging instrument as investors sought to control the amount of 
sovereign risk thereby added to their portfolio. 
 
Ahn, Boudoukh, Richardson and Whitelaw (1998) study the problem of hedging 
Brady bonds. Using data that ends in December 1996 they find that only about 15% of 
the variance of Brady bonds could be hedged using the 10-year T-note futures 
contract as the hedging instrument. This was the case even through they also used a 
hedge ratio adjusted for state variables that proxy for the level of US interest rates, the 
probability of default and the maturity of the Brady bond. Evidently at that time the 
futures market did not span the outcomes pre-packaged in a Brady bond so hedging 
was ineffective. 
 
The CME responded to this need by offering a menu of six Brady bond futures 
contracts, two each for Argentinean, Brazilian and Mexican Brady bonds. Specifically 
they introduced futures contracts written on a floating rate Argentinean, Argentine 
FRB, a Brazilian fixed rate, Brazil EI and a Mexican Par Brady bond Mexican PAR in 
1996 followed in 1997 by futures contracts written on an Argentinean Par Brady 
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bond, Argentine PAR, a fixed rate Brazilian Brady, Brazil C BARRA and a Mexican 
CETES bond all of which were US dollar denominated.  
 
Some of these futures contracts enjoyed a moderate amount of success. Table 1 
reports the open interest of all six Brady bond futures contracts. It is notable that some 
contracts such as the Argentinean floating rate Brady bond futures contract initially 
enjoyed a considerable amount of interest while others such as the Argentinean par 
Brady bond futures contract never traded at all. In other cases such as the Brazil EI 
Brady and the Mexico Brady bond futures contract we observe long periods of trading 
inactivity followed by spurts in trading as hedgers and speculators respond to changes 
in uncertainty and return to the Brady bond futures market.  After March 1999 
however, no Brady bond futures contract traded. Nevertheless the CME continued to 
list these contracts, hoping that interest would pick up, and provided daily settlement 
quotes that is later shown to be reasonable accurate.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Eventually the CME became discouraged by the lack of trading in Brady bond futures 
contracts such that on October 5, 2001 all six Brady bond futures contracts were 
withdrawn from the CME. This is surprising as credit risk, as measured by the credit 
spread as shown in Figure 1, was rising. It is during times of increasing credit risk one 
would expect that interest in these futures contracts would pick up as they have in the 
past as investors seek to hedge and speculate in this volatile environment. It is this 
surprising lack of interest in Brady bond futures contracts that this paper seeks to 
explain. 
 
Meanwhile the credit derivative market developed in parallel to the Brady bond 
market. These innovative instruments allow investors to trade credit risk. Like the 
interest rate swap market of the early 80’s, the credit default swap market enjoyed 
explosive growth. The British Bankers Association BBA estimates that from January 
1996 to December 2001 the notional principal amount of all credit derivatives 
outstanding grew one hundred fold, from $20 billion to nearly $2 trillion of which 
around 45% are credit default swaps (See BBA, 1996, 2002). Early problems such as 
a lack of standard products and documentation and regulatory uncertainty were soon 
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overcome. The more difficult issue of how to price these instruments was clarified by 
credit derivative pricing models of Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull (1997), Das and 
Sundaram (1998) and Duffie and Singleton (1999) amongst others. 
 
The interesting feature of CDS contracts, the most popular credit derivative, is that 
they can act as a substitute product for those wishing to control the risk of adding 
Brady bonds to their portfolio. A CDS can be likened to an insurance contract where 
payoffs are typically conditional upon a formal definition of default on the insured 
bond. In the parlance of the credit default swap market the insured bond is the 
reference security. Typical default payments are par less the value of the defaulted 
reference security. In turn the buyer of credit protection pays a swap premium quoted 
as a number of basis points times a notional principal amount of the reference 
security. The swap premium is quoted at annual rates, but swap premium payments 
are typically paid quarterly. If the reference security should default, the buyer of credit 
protection would receive the default payment and the flow of swap premium 
payments would cease.  
 
The above suggests that an investor in Brady bonds can control Sovereign credit risk 
by purchasing a CDS written on a Brady bond because the Brady bond CDS would 
pay off only when the Sovereign experiences a credit event and pay nothing 
otherwise. Moreover as the prospects of Sovereign default changes, so too will the 
price of the CDS. Alternatively the investor can hedge Sovereign credit risk by 
shorting exchange traded Brady bond futures contracts.   
 
It is not obvious which alternative will prove to be superior. The major difference 
between the exchange traded futures contract and the over the counter CDS is cost. 
The CDS requires quarterly insurance payments that can be extraordinarily expensive 
if the reference bond is close to default. Meanwhile the futures contract requires more 
modest mark to market payments to maintain the margin account within the safety 
margin.  
 
Otherwise there is not much to choose from when comparing Brady bond futures and 
CDS contracts as potential hedging instruments. Exchange traded futures contracts 
have the advantages of enhanced liquidity caused by transparency, standardized 
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contracts and reduced counterparty credit risk. On the other hand, exchanged traded 
futures contracts are so standardized that they lack flexibility.  In contrast over the 
counter contracts are more flexible but less liquid, as pricing is less transparent, 
contracts are less standardized, and there are no contractual safeguards against 
counterparty default. However these stylized differences have narrowed in recent 
years as the growth in the CDS market implies greater liquidity and this growth is 
driven by standardized contracts, reduction in regulatory uncertainty and 
improvements in pricing transparency via model development and acceptance. 
Therefore the difference in advantages and disadvantages between the exchange 
traded Brady futures contracts and the over the counter CDS contracts may have 
narrowed so that it is simply an empirical issue as to which alternative forms the 
better hedging instrument.  
 
In summary the issue is whether the CDS contract forms a hedge so effective that it 
overcomes its disadvantage of extra cost vis á vis the Brady bond futures contract. The 
prerequisite is that the CDS contract must form a superior hedge and it is this aspect 
of the issue this paper concentrates on. 
 
3. DATA 
 
The first step is to select the bonds that are to be hedged. The collection procedure 
initially considers all US dollar denominated Argentinean, Brazilian, Mexican and 
Venezuelan Brady and international bonds that are available on Bloomberg on May 5, 
2001. Bonds of the first three countries examine the hedging performance of the full 
menu of CME futures contracts available prior to May 5, 2001. The Venezuelan 
bonds examine the cross hedging performance of the CME Brady futures contracts on 
bonds of geographically related countries.2 Including international bonds increase the 
sample size. These international bonds are obligations of sovereigns that have Brady 
bonds outstanding and so should have a similar risk profile as the Brady bonds. The 
sample includes only those bonds where the bid price on Bloomberg changed from 
one day to the next for more than 95% of the business days from April 1, 1999 to 
October 5, 2001. Sarig and Warga (1989) point out that quoted prices that do not 
change from day to day are liable to be stale and inaccurate. In summary the bond 
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data consists of daily closing bid prices of twelve Brady and international bonds, four 
Argentinean, three Brazilian and Mexican and two Venezuelan bonds, details of 
which are reported in Table II. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
The next step is to select the futures contracts that will be used as hedging 
instruments.  Initially we select a wide range of potential hedging instruments 
including the two, five, ten and fifteen-year T-note futures, the one-month LIBOR and 
the S&P 500 futures, six Brady bond futures contracts and two, five and ten year CDS 
for Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela. However all the T-note futures, the one 
month LIBOR and S&P 500 futures contracts performed poorly in sample as well as 
out of sample. Therefore for the sake of brevity we concentrate our attention on the 
competing Brandy Bond futures and CDS contracts in hedging emerging market 
bonds.3 
 
We select the six Brady bond futures contracts that traded on the CME until May 5, 
2001, specifically the Argentine FRB, Argentine PAR, Brazil C BARRA, Brazil EI, 
Mexican PAR and the Mexican CETES bond futures contracts, details of which are 
contained in Table III. An unresolved issue however, is how accurate are the CME 
reported settlement prices when the underlying contract did not trade after March 
1999. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
To gage the quality of CME quotes, daily changes in the CME quotes ∆PBft are 
regressed against daily changes in the price of bonds ∆PBt. In other words the 
following regression is run. 
 
(1)                                                                                                 PP tBftBt µβα +∆+=∆  
 
As discussed later the R2 of this regression represents how closely the daily change in 
bond price ∆PBt and futures price ∆PBft are related and can be interpreted as a measure 
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of hedge effectiveness. Equation (1) is run for three bonds, the floating rate Argentina 
bond of March 29, 2049, the floating rate Brazil bond of April 5, 2004 and the 
11.375% Mexico bond of September 25, 2016, against the corresponding sovereign 
Brady bond futures contracts.4  These three bonds are selected because they were 
actively quoted from the date that the corresponding Brady bond futures contracts 
were first offered until the end of the sample period. These regressions are run using a 
constant sample size of 220 trading days by rolling the regression period forward one 
day at a time while simultaneously dropping the first observation each time the 
sample rolls forward one day. Each regression series begins at the date the Brady 
bond futures contract commenced trading and continues until August 17, 2001.5  
 
A plot of the R2 for each series reveals that there is no “cliff” where the R2 suddenly 
drops once the Brady bond futures contract no longer trades. Also the R2 of periods 
when Brady bond futures were trading do not appear any different than the R2 of 
periods when Brady bond futures were not trading. In summary there appears to be no 
evidence that the lack of trading in the underlying futures contracts resulted in a gross 
deterioration in quality of the data. The CME supplied quotes appear to contain useful 
information concerning the hedging opportunities provided by the menu of Brady 
bond futures contracts.  
 
It is not surprising that Brady bond futures quotes contain useful information 
concerning the hedging effectiveness of Brady bond futures contracts even though the 
futures contract did not actually trade for much of the period under study. Brady bond 
futures contracts are written on cash assets whose primary demand is for investment 
purposes so the relationship between the cash asset’s price and its’ corresponding 
futures price is guided by strong arbitrage free relationships (see Hull 2005, page 97 
for details). Therefore given the underlying cash asset’s price (which does actively 
trade) the theoretically correct futures price can be obtained from this relation without 
the guidance of trading activity in the futures market. As the standard textbook 
treatment of this relationship does not cover the case of futures contracts written on 
cash assets subject to credit risk we present the formal arbitrage free relationship in 
the Appendix. 
 
 11 
The futures data consists of daily settlement prices. Castelino (1992) warns that 
futures contracts lifted far from expiration have lower hedge ratios than those lifted 
closer to maturity. To assure the results are comparable, the nearest maturing futures 
contract is used as the hedging instrument. However, at the expiry month, the data 
switches to the next maturing contract. 
 
The final step is to select the CDS contracts that will be used as hedging instruments. 
The CDS data consists of daily quoted prices for two, five and ten year CDS for 
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela.6 Each CDS price reflects the annual 
number of basis points, paid in quarterly installments, that investors must make to 
insure a bond from default for two, five and ten years respectively. These CDS swap 
quotes are generic in the sense that they represent insurance prices for any US dollar 
denominated bond of the corresponding sovereign for the contracted period of 
insurance. Based on a notional principal amount of $100, and knowing the basis point 
price and the maturity and therefore the number of quarterly installments, it is a trivial 
matter to convert CDS basis point prices into dollar prices. Specifically the basis point 
price converts into dollar prices based on a $100 notional principal amount by present 
valuing the cash flow stream of each CDS contract using the two, five and ten year 
constant maturity US Treasury bond yields as reported by the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York. 
 
The CDS prices were available from April 1, 1999 until May 22, 2002. Given that the 
Brady bond futures contracts were withdrawn on October 5, 2001 the dataset contains 
daily observations for fifteen potential hedging instruments and twelve emerging 
market bonds from April 1, 1999 until October 5, 2001.  
 
In summary this paper will hedge twelve Brady and international bonds of Argentina, 
Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela using nine hedging instruments. Specifically the 
hedging instruments are the two, five and ten year CDS contracts for Argentina, 
Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela and the six Brady bond futures contracts, namely the 
Argentine FRB, Argentine PAR, Brazil C BARRA, Brazil EI, Mexican PAR and the 
Mexican CETES bond futures contracts. 
 
 12 
4. METHODOLOGY 
 
The next step is to choose the statistical methodology. This paper estimates hedge 
ratios according to Ederington (1979) where the measure of hedging effectiveness is 
the R2 from an OLS regression of the daily Brady bond’s price change ∆PB on say, the 
daily price change on the Brady bond futures contract ∆PBf. In this regression the 
slope parameter β is a measure of the minimum variance hedge ratio.  OLS is 
preferred to an error correction model because Lien (2005a, b) shows that OLS can 
provide a superior hedge ratio in an out of sample context even when the statistical 
properties of the data favor the error correction model. Price changes are preferred as 
Terry (2005) shows that OLS hedge ratios computed from price changes are variance 
minimizing but the same hedge ratio computed from log returns or percentage returns 
are not variance minimizing. In summary the hedge ratio β is from the OLS regression 
as previously shown in (1). 
 
However, the R2 from (1) is only an in sample measure of hedge effectiveness 
because it presumes that the hedger can use the hedge ratio at the beginning of the 
hedge period when in fact this statistic cannot be known until the end of the period. 
Specifically (1) is run on the entire sample period until date t to hedge from date t-1 to 
t and so uses information that cannot be known at the beginning of the hedge period at 
date t-1.  
 
An out of sample test provides a more rigorous measure of hedge effectiveness and is 
formed in the following way. First run an OLS regression on the first 220 data points 
in the sample to estimate the hedge ratio β. Then form a hedge portfolio consisting of 
the target Brady bond to be held long VB and a number of hedging instruments to be 
held short VBf as indicated by the hedge ratio β. This forms the following hedge 
portfolio Vh at the end of the 220th day. 
 
(2)                                                                                                                 VVV BfBh β−=
 
 
Then measure the value of (2) one day later to measure the unexpected gains/losses 
(hedging errors) H on the hedge portfolio that evolves by the end of the 221st day. 
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Subscripting the value of the Brady bond and Brady bond futures contract by 220 and 
221 to represent the price of the instrument at the end of the 220th and 221st day 
respectively the hedging error is measured as follows. 
 
H)VV()VV(V 221,Bf220,Bf221,B220,Bh =−β−−=∆  
 
Repeating this process by rolling the estimation period forward each day, dropping the 
first data point in the estimation period to maintain a consistent sample size, and 
forming the hedge portfolio one day later obtains a sequence of hedging errors. In this 
way the hedge is formed at time t using information that is available at time t to hedge 
during period t +1. However, it was noticed that in the weeks leading up to the 
withdrawal of the Brady bond futures contracts from the CME the incidence of repeat 
observations of the same daily settlement price increased clearly indicating that 
interest in these contracts was waning. To avoid possible reliance on stale and 
unrepresentative data, the out of sample tests end on August 17, 2001, seven weeks 
prior to the withdrawal of the Brady bond futures contracts from the CME. This 
means that the out of sample tests run from February 2, 2000 to August 17, 2001, 402 
daily observations in all. 
 
A measure of the out of sample hedge effectiveness is a ratio defined as, 
 
P
H
C
= −
∑
∑





1
2
2  
 
Here P is the “protection ratio”, ΣH2 is the sum of squared hedging errors for the 
sequence of hedge portfolios and ΣC2 is the sum of squared gains and losses for the 
target bond to be hedged. Hence this protection ratio is a relative measure indicating 
how successful the hedge is in reducing the variation in the target emerging market 
bond’s gains and losses. If the hedging errors were all zero the above ratio would be 1 
representing a perfect hedge. More realistically there will be hedging errors but as 
long as hedging errors are smaller than the target bond’s gains and losses, the above 
ratio will be greater than zero. This represents some degree of hedging, the closer to 
one, the better. Ratios less than zero would indicate that the hedge failed in that the 
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squared hedging errors were greater than the bond’s squared gains and losses. In other 
words, instead of reducing the range of outcomes, the hedge actually increased them. 
Thinking of ΣH2 as the “error sum of squares” and ΣC2 as the “total sum of squares”, 
the above ratio is seen as analogous to R2, but unlike R2 a negative protection ratio P 
can occur. 
 
The objective is to compare the protection ratio estimated by hedging a given bond 
with say a CDS contract with the analogous protection ratio obtained by hedging the 
same bond with say a Brady bond futures contract. The instrument that obtains the 
highest protection ratio is the most effective hedging instrument. However one 
protection ratio can be larger than another merely due to chance. Therefore it is 
necessary to use a statistical test so that statistical inferences can be made regarding 
the significance of differences in protection ratios. 
 
The standard procedure for testing the statistical significance of differences in the size 
of statistics like the protection ratio P is to conduct an F-test. However this test will 
not be valid in this case since an F-test of the protection ratio P is critically dependent 
upon the assumption of independently distributed hedging errors H. Since out of 
sample tests comparing two hedging alternatives are used to hedge the same bond the 
hedging errors are not statistically independent so the usual F-test is not valid. 
However Snedecor and Cochran (1989) provide a test that resolves this problem.7  
 
Two new variables, S and D are each constructed from two series of hedging errors, 
each series is formed from hedging the same bond but using a different hedging 
instrument.  S is formed by the sum of two series of hedging errors and D is formed 
by the difference of two series of hedging errors. For instance S can be formed by 
taking the hedging errors produced by hedging a given bond with CDS contracts and 
adding them to the hedging errors produced by hedging the same bond with Brady 
futures contracts. Similarly subtracting the two series of hedging errors can form D. 
Snedecor and Cochran (1989) show that if the sample correlation between these two 
constructed variables S and D is significantly negative then the first hedging 
instrument, the CDS contract in the example, produces a significantly lower hedging 
error than the second hedging instrument, Brady bond futures in the example. 
 15 
Correspondingly, if the correlation is significantly positive, then the Brady bond 
futures contract forms a more effective hedge than the CDS contract and if the 
correlation is insignificant then both hedging instruments are equally good in reducing 
hedging error.  
 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Out of sample hedges are formed 402 times, each day from February 2, 2000 to 
August 17, 2001, for each of nine hedging instruments to hedge 12 emerging market 
bonds, a total of 43,416 out of sample tests in all. Table 4 reports the out of sample 
hedge performance as measured by the protection ratio. The Panel A of Table 4 
reports the protection ratio for the entire out of sample period while Panel B reports 
the protection ratio for the first half and Panel C reports the protection ratio for the 
second half of the out of sample hedging period. For each panel the first column 
reveals the target bond to be hedged and the second column reports the realised price 
variance for each bond thereby giving some idea of the amount of risk that is to be 
hedged for each bond. Columns three to eleven report the protection ratio, the 
measure of out of sample hedging performance, for each of the nine hedging 
instruments.  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
Clearly Panel A shows that CDS contracts dominate the Brady bond futures contracts 
as hedging instruments for the entire sample period by achieving the highest 
protection ratios for eleven of the twelve target bonds. The sole exception is the 
13.625% Venezuelan bond where the most effective hedging instrument is the 
Brazilian BARRA futures contract.  
 
However these findings obscure some interesting information that is more fully 
revealed through an examination of the sub periods. In Panel B it is evident that 
during the first half of the sample period the menu of Brady bond futures competed 
more effectively with CDS contracts, as they were able to form the most effective 
hedge in nearly half of the twelve target emerging market bonds that we wish to 
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hedge. In contrast Panel C reveals that during the second half of the sample period 
only two bonds are more effectively hedged using Brady bond futures contracts. 
Clearly these findings indicate that the hedging performance of the Brady bond 
futures contracts is deteriorating while the hedging performance of the CDS market is 
improving in the period leading up to the withdrawal of the Brady bond futures 
contract from the CME. The question now arises whether these differences in hedge 
effectiveness were statistically significant. 
 
Table 5 (a) reports the statistical significance of the differences in hedge effectiveness 
as reported in Table 4, panel A for the entire out of sample period. Similarly Tables 5 
(b) and (c) report the corresponding statistical significance of the differences in hedge 
effectiveness for the first and second half of the out of sample period respectively as 
reported in panels B and C of Table 4.   
 
[Table 5 a, b and c about here] 
 
Turning first to the overall results Table 5 (a) reports that the case for the CDS 
contract is more compelling. Specifically for the 13.625% Venezuela bond of 2018, 
the only instance when a Brady bond futures contract has a protection ratio greater 
than the menu of CDS contracts, the protection ratio achieved when hedging using the 
Brazilian BARRA futures contract is not significantly greater than the protection ratio 
achieved when using a two year CDS contract. On the other hand, in the remaining 
eleven instances when Table 4 panel A reports a larger protection ratio for a CDS 
contract, nine of these are significantly greater than the protection ratios achieved by 
the entire menu of Brady bond futures contracts at least at the 5% significance level. 
Clearly the hedge effectiveness of CDS contracts dominates the hedge effectiveness 
of the Brady bond futures contracts in a statistically significant way for the overall out 
of sample period. 
 
Looking now at the sub period results, the story of the deteriorating hedge 
effectiveness for Brady bond futures contracts and improving hedge effectiveness for 
CDS contracts is bolstered by the statistical tests. Specifically for the first half of the 
sample period Table 4 panel B reports that a Brady bond futures contract achieves the 
highest protection ratio in five instances but now Table 5 (b) reports that the 
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improvement in the protection ratio over the next best CDS contract is never 
statistically significant. In the meantime Table 4 also reports that the CDS contract 
has a superior hedge performance in the remaining seven instances but now Table 5 
(b) reports that only three of the seven are statistically significant. Evidently it appears 
that the CDS contract has the edge on the Brady bond futures contract in the first half 
of the sample period, but the case for the CDS contract is not compelling. 
 
However the CDS contract dominates the Brady bond futures contract in the second 
half of the sample. Specifically Table 4 panel C reports that a Brady bond futures 
contract achieves the highest protection ratio in only two instances none of which are 
significantly greater than the next best CDS contract as reported by Table 5 (c). In the 
meantime Table 4 panel C also reports that the CDS contract has a superior hedge 
performance in the remaining ten instances and now Table 5 (b) reports that eight of 
these ten are statistically significant.  
 
Clearly Tables 4 and 5 are presenting a story. At first the Brady bond futures contracts 
were able to compete reasonably well with the CDS market in hedging emerging 
market sovereign bonds but as the CDS market continued to develop the CDS contract 
performed better as a hedging instrument. Evidently, as credit spreads widened in 
2001, hedgers used the CDS market rather than return to the exchange traded futures 
market thereby discouraging the CME. Eventually the CME gave up hope that traders 
would return to the Brady bond futures market and de-listed these securities on 
October 5, 2001.  
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper investigates an empirical puzzle. Specifically at the height of the last credit 
risk cycle when interest in hedging and speculating in sovereign credit risk would be 
at its peak, the CME withdrew the full menu of Brady bond futures contracts, 
precisely the sort of contract designed to hedge and speculate in sovereign credit risk. 
Since the Brady bond futures data are CME supplied quotes rather than trade prices 
this paper first examines the quality of the Brady bond futures quote data. This 
examination finds that CME supplied quotes based on arbitrage free arguments 
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contain useful information concerning the hedging opportunities provided by the 
menu of Brady bond futures contracts. 
 
This paper presents evidence that the demise of the Brady bond futures contracts is 
related to the rise of the emerging CDS market. Specifically the out of sample tests 
find that while the CDS contract often formed a superior hedging instrument to the 
menu of Brady bond futures contracts that were available in the first half of the 
sample period the differences in hedge performance were statistically significant for 
only three of twelve emerging market bonds in the sample. However in the second 
half of the sample period leading up to the date that the CME withdrew all Brady 
bond futures contracts, the CDS contract achieved a superior hedge performance that 
was significantly greater than all possible Brady bond futures contracts for eight of the 
twelve bonds in the sample. In summary this paper finds evidence that at first the 
Brady bond futures contracts were able to compete reasonably well with the CDS 
market but as the CDS market continued to develop the CDS contract performed 
better as a hedging instrument. 
 
The results of this paper implies that the developing CDS market improved the 
effectiveness of hedging Sovereign risk to the point where exchange traded futures 
contracts specifically designed to tackle this problem were made redundant. 
Moreover, it suggests that exchange traded products face competition with 
innovations in the less transparent over the counter market. The results also indicate 
the way forward for the exchange traded futures market to respond to such 
competition. Specifically, it is possible that an exchange traded futures contract can be 
constructed based on an average of surveyed CDS values to provide a cheap method 
for traders to hedge and speculate in sovereign credit risk. 
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APPENDIX 
 
The following arbitrage free argument closely follows Hull (2005) but has been 
adapted to include a futures contract written on an asset subject to credit risk. The 
following hedging argument applies as the asset underlying the futures contract is 
held primarily for investment purposes. See Hull (2005, page 97) for details. 
 
Consider the following two portfolios. 
 
1. f + Kexp-rfT 
2. B - Cexp-rfτ - P 
 
The instruments in portfolio 1 are f, a long position in a futures contract written on a 
bond B subject to credit risk committing the long position to buy the bond at date T, 
and an investment in a zero coupon risk free bond that at maturity T pays off the 
amount K needed to fulfil the commitment to purchase the bond subject to credit risk 
under the terms of the futures contract. The instruments in portfolio 2 are a long 
position in the bond subject to credit risk B, borrowings at the risk free rate maturing 
at date τ (0 < τ < T) that requires the repayment of C which is the same amount as the 
promised coupon payable on the bond B at date τ, and finally the immediate payment 
of a premium P on a credit default swap on C units of bond B. The last instrument is 
designed to insure the coupon payment on the bond subject to credit risk should the 
bond default at date τ.  
 
Portfolios 1 and 2 both have the same cash flow payoffs in all states of nature. To 
demonstrate this, consider the following diagram that outlines all possible scenarios 
until maturity at date T. 
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At intermediate date τ the bond can default D or not default ND. Nothing is payable 
from portfolio 1 at date τ in any event. The borrowing of C is due at date τ from 
portfolio 2 in any event and needs to be netted to zero in order to match the cash flow 
structure of portfolio 1. Should the bond default, the credit default swap pays C units 
of bond B and is used to repay the borrowings C so not net cash flow is received from 
portfolio 2 should the bond B default. If the bond does not default at time τ then the 
borrowing C is repaid from the coupon C received from the bond B. Meanwhile the 
CDS expires worthless. Therefore at date τ the net cash flow structure of portfolio 2 
matches the cash flow structure 1. 
 
At maturity date T the bond can default D or not default ND.  The delivery price K 
available from the maturing zero coupon bond is used to satisfy the delivery 
requirements on the maturing futures contract f so portfolio 1 is worth Bd if the bond 
is in default or B if the bond is not in default. Portfolio 2 is worth Bd if the bond is in 
default and B if the bond is not in default since the only remaining instrument in 
portfolio 2 is a long position in the bond B. Therefore at date T the net cash flow 
structure of portfolio 2 matches the cash flow structure 1. 
 
Since it is known that portfolio 1 is worth the same as portfolio 2 in all possible future 
states of nature then to prevent arbitrage portfolio 1 and 2 must have the same price 
today. 
 
f + Kexp-rfT = B - Cexp-rfτ - P 
 
By definition, the futures price F is that delivery price K that resets the value of the 
futures contract f to zero. Imposing this condition the above is re-written below. 
 
 Fexp-rfT = B - Cexp-rfτ - P 
 
Solving the above expression for the futures price F we obtain the desired result. 
F = (B – C exp-rfτ - P)exprfT 
 
t = 0 t = τ t = T 
D ND D ND 
1. f + Kexp-rfT    0  0 Bd  B 
2. B - Cexp-rfτ - P        -C + C     -C + C Bd  B 
 21 
In other words the futures price F on a futures contract written on an instrument 
subject to credit risk is the same as the futures price on a futures contract written on an 
asset not subject to credit risk (F = (B – C exp-rfτ)exprfT , see Hull 2005, page 97) less 
the future value of a credit default swap premium P that insures the nominal value of 
any coupon payment promised prior to maturity of the futures contact. The great point 
of this appendix is that there exists a strong arbitrage free relation that dictates what 
the futures price should be given observable values of B, C, rf and P. This implies that 
the CME is able to report reasonable settlement prices that are useful for hedging 
purposes even though the underlying futures contract did not often trade. 
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Table 1 
This table shows the open interest by month for the following Brady bond futures contracts, Argentina 
Floating Rate Brady bond futures, AR FRB, Argentina Par Brady bond futures, AR PAR, Brazil BARRA 
Brady futures, BR Bara, Brazil EI Brady bond futures, BR Brad, Mexico Brady bond futures MX Brad and 
Mexico CETAS bond futures, MX CET.  
 AR FRB AR PAR BR Bara BR Brad MX Brad MX Cetas 
Jul-96 437 0 0 0 122 0 
Aug-96 369 0 0 0 122 0 
Sep-96 330 0 0 0 121 0 
Oct-96 375 0 0 0 2 0 
Nov-96 378 0 0 0 1 0 
Dec-96 453 0 0 0 1 0 
Jan-97 170 0 0 0 0 0 
Feb-97 350 0 0 0 0 0 
Mar-97 255 0 0 0 0 0 
Apr-97 221 0 0 0 0 0 
May-97 181 0 0 0 0 391 
Jun-97 261 0 0 0 0 493 
Jul-97 0 0 0 0 0 415 
Aug-97 225 0 0 0 10 533 
Sep-97 10 0 0 0 70 626 
Oct-97 50 0 0 0 50 218 
Nov-97 50 0 0 0 46 267 
Dec-97 15 0 0 0 20 234 
Jan-98 15 0 0 0 0 120 
Feb-98 15 0 0 0 0 47 
Mar-98 5 0 0 0 0 100 
Apr-98 0 0 0 0 0 18 
May-98 0 0 0 0 0 25 
Jun-98 0 0 0 0 0 35 
Jul-98 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Aug-98 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sep-98 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Oct-98 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nov-98 0 0 0 1050 0 0 
Dec-98 0 0 0 1050 0 0 
Jan-99 0 0 0 1050 0 1 
Feb-99 0 0 0 1872 0 1 
Mar-99 0 0 0 1872 0 1 
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Table 2 
This table reports the salient details of the bond issues that we attempt to hedge using exchange traded futures and the over the counter 
CDS contracts. Trading frequency is the ratio of the number of business days that the bid price changed to the number of business days in 
the sample period from April 1, 1999 to October 5, 2001. 
Issuer ISIN Issue Date Maturity Coupon Amount in 
millions $ 
Bond Type Collateral / 
Seniority 
Trading 
Frequency 
(in %)  
Argentina XS0043120236 03/31/93 03/29/49 Libor + 81.25 bp 8,467 Brady US Treasury Zeros 97.01 
Argentina US040114AN02 10/09/96 10/09/06 11 1,300 International Unsubordinated 98.49 
Argentina US040114BE93 04/07/99 04/07/09 11.75 1,500 International Unsubordinated 99.00 
Argentina US040114AR16 01/30/97 01/30/17 11.625 4,575 International Unsubordinated 98.01 
Brazil XS0049977191 04/15/94 04/14/12 Libor + 87.5 bp 8,490 Brady US Treasury Zeros 95.77 
Brazil US105756AH38 04/30/99 04/05/04 11.625 3,000 International Unsubordinated 98.75 
Brazil US105756AJ93 10/25/99 10/15/09 14.5 2,000 International Unsubordinated 99.00 
Mexico US91086QAB41 04/06/99 04/06/05 9.75 1,000 International Senior Notes 97.99 
Mexico US593048BB61 01/14/97 01/15/07 9.875 1,500 International Unsubordinated 97.23 
Mexico US593048BA88 09/24/96 09/15/16 11.375 2,395 International Unsubordinated 96.77 
Venezuela XS0029435491 12/18/90 12/18/07 Libor + 87.5 bp 5,353 Brady US Treasury Zeros 95.28 
Venezuela US922646AT10 08/06/98 08/15/18 13.625 500 International Unsubordinated 96.18 
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Table 3* 
This table reports the details of the contract specifications of the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange Brady bond futures contracts applicable during the sample period from 
April 1, 1999 to October 5, 2001. 
 Argentine 
FRB 
Argentine 
PAR 
Brazil 'C' 
BARRA 
Brazil 'EI' Mexican 
PAR 
Mexican 
CETES 
Contract 
size 
$100,000 $100,000 $100,000 $100,000 $250,000 $250,000 
Minimum 
tick size 
$10 $10 $10 $10 $25 $25 
Trading 
Months 
March, 
June, 
Sept, Dec. 
March, 
June, 
Sept, Dec. 
March, 
June, Sept, 
Dec. 
March, 
June, 
Sept, Dec. 
March, 
June, 
Sept, Dec. 
March, 
June, Sept, 
Dec. 
Speculative 
limits 
2,500 
contracts, 
(500 in 
spot 
month) 
2,500 
contracts, 
(500 in 
spot 
month) 
2,500 
contracts, 
(500 in 
spot 
month) 
2,500 
contracts, 
(500 in 
spot 
month) 
1,000 
contracts, 
(200 in 
spot 
month) 
1,000 
contracts, 
(200 in spot 
month) 
*
 Source, Special Executive Report, Chicago Mercantile Exchange, June 13, 1997 and December 8, 
1997.
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Table 4 
This table shows the out of sample hedge effectiveness as measured by the protection ratio. The most effective value is 
highlighted in bold. The dollar price variance of the bond to be hedged is σ2Bond.The hedging instruments are the two 
year CDS, CDS 2, five year CDS, CDS 5, ten year CDS, CDS 10, Argentina Floating Rate Brady bond futures, AR 
FRB, Argentina Par Brady bond futures, AR PAR, Brazil BARRA Brady futures, BR Bara, Brazil EI Brady bond 
futures, BR Brad, Mexico Brady bond futures MX Brad and Mexico CETAS bond futures, MX CET.  
Panel A: Full sample-February 2, 2000 to August 17, 2001 
Instrument (coupon, 
issuer, maturity) 
σ2Bond CDS 2 CDS 5 CDS 
10 
AR 
FRB 
AR 
PAR 
BR 
Bara 
BR 
Brad 
MX 
Brad 
MX 
Cetas 
Float. Argentina 1/49 37.024 60.52 57.63 53.35 0.33 13.51 28.46 22.83 1.65 -0.18 
11 Argentina 10/06 33.267 30.88 36.44 51.03 0.31 12.31 20.62 19.51 0.77 -0.43 
11.75 Argentina 7/09 65.609 47.60 50.30 48.88 9.40 12.70 27.86 23.16 1.50 -0.40 
11.375 Argentina 1/17 46.080 44.37 47.42 43.50 16.40 12.57 28.91 17.45 1.56 -0.43 
Float. Brazil 4/12 0.488 27.98 31.63 56.49 6.77 12.27 47.36 27.79 6.22 -1.47 
11.625 Brazil 4/04 0.176 46.72 41.25 55.77 6.28 16.81 43.06 36.55 8.69 -0.61 
14.50 Brazil 10/09 1.213 42.32 42.69 63.45 11.52 17.79 50.21 34.31 8.55 -5.11 
9.75 Mexico 4/05 0.068 27.22 35.56 22.44 5.48 10.32 17.35 9.81 22.33 -3.21 
9.875 Mexico 1/07 0.163 27.01 37.55 31.61 5.60 11.12 21.01 10.14 22.27 -1.94 
11.375 Mexico 9/16 1.518 22.91 31.27 33.52 6.95 15.07 30.32 15.01 23.47 -0.70 
Float. Venezuela 12/07 0.165 23.46 -3.57 -4.28 0.57 8.58 18.76 10.49 4.46 -2.25 
13.625 Venezuela 8/18 1.491 7.55 -9.65 -8.81 -2.06 3.30 9.26 3.77 -0.83 -2.70 
Panel B: First Half of Sample-February 2, 2000 to November 9, 2000 
Float. Argentina 1/49 0.117 42.19 59.98 51.96 59.10 37.99 33.45 24.28 8.29 -0.36 
11 Argentina 10/06 0.733 32.58 40.85 33.96 29.19 27.38 10.95 8.41 5.54 0.01 
11.75 Argentina 7/09 1.728 31.35 48.52 44.97 40.54 39.68 25.99 18.03 7.23 -0.06 
11.375 Argentina 1/17 1.040 24.27 42.91 35.10 45.30 42.78 34.34 20.99 8.00 -0.09 
Float. Brazil 4/12 0.338 2.00 -4.67 47.42 25.60 22.16 51.08 31.53 12.37 -0.39 
11.625 Brazil 4/04 0.042 2.95 -15.25 45.56 21.10 21.94 43.10 37.71 20.33 -1.39 
14.50 Brazil 10/09 0.490 2.29 -7.46 52.64 32.62 34.23 60.33 45.12 23.42 5.74 
9.75 Mexico 4/05 0.130 34.75 44.95 27.09 12.64 13.25 20.34 11.16 28.07 -2.99 
9.875 Mexico 1/07 0.313 34.82 43.88 35.71 12.10 14.11 21.08 9.65 26.74 -1.09 
11.375 Mexico 9/16 2.632 23.63 32.78 36.07 15.47 21.13 32.62 16.53 30.27 -0.62 
Float. Venezuela 12/07 0.212 14.82 -27.26 -25.18 11.08 11.81 18.94 12.10 4.98 -0.95 
13.625 Venezuela 8/18 2.850 3.08 -17.56 -15.25 0.28 2.29 6.96 2.96 -1.61 -0.84 
Panel C: Second Half of Sample-November 10, 2000 to August 17, 2001 
Float. Argentina 1/49 71.422 61.82 57.47 53.45 -3.82 11.78 28.11 22.72 1.18 -0.16 
11 Argentina 10/06 62.209 30.70 35.96 52.89 -2.84 10.67 21.67 20.72 0.25 -0.48 
11.75 Argentina 7/09 125.14 50.03 50.57 49.46 4.74 8.67 28.14 23.92 0.65 -0.45 
11.375 Argentina 1/17 88.502 48.48 48.34 45.21 10.49 6.39 27.80 16.73 0.24 -0.50 
Floating Brazil 4/12 0.638 50.40 62.96 64.32 -9.48 3.74 44.15 24.57 0.91 -2.40 
11.625 Brazil 4/04 0.302 66.39 66.64 60.35 -4.23 11.09 40.71 33.43 -0.29 -4.41 
14.50 Brazil 10/09 1.906 66.40 72.85 69.95 -3.08 6.13 43.04 26.38 -2.37 -13.91 
9.75 Mexico 4/05 0.003 -0.31 1.22 5.40 -20.74 -0.38 6.42 4.86 1.32 -4.03 
9.875 Mexico 1/07 0.009 4.10 19.01 19.58 -13.48 2.36 20.81 11.58 9.18 -4.46 
11.375 Mexico 9/16 0.320 20.92 27.06 26.44 -16.66 -1.75 23.93 10.80 4.64 -0.90 
Float. Venezuela 12/07 0.114 37.49 34.91 29.66 -16.51 3.34 18.47 7.89 3.63 -4.36 
13.625 Venezuela 8/18 0.078 22.97 17.62 13.39 -10.13 6.78 17.19 6.59 1.87 -9.10 
Table 5 (a) 
This table shows the results of the out of sample hedge effectiveness test as measured by the correlation test for the entire sample period, from February 2, 2000 to 
August 17, 2001. The first data column reports the most effective hedging instrument and its protection ratio PR. All other data cells are the correlation between the 
sum and the difference in hedging errors of the most effective hedging instrument and the alternative hedging instrument. All data is in percent. The hedging 
instruments are the two year CDS, CDS 2, five year CDS, CDS 5, ten year CDS, CDS 10, Argentina Floating Rate Brady bond futures, AR FRB, Argentina Par 
Brady bond futures, AR PAR, Brazil BARRA Brady futures, BR Bara, Brazil EI Brady bond futures, BR Brad, Mexico Brady bond futures MX Brad and Mexico 
CETAS bond futures, MX CET. 
Instrument (coupon, issuer, 
maturity) 
Best Hedge 
(PR) 
Best Vs. 
CDS2 
Best Vs. 
CDS5 
Best Vs. 
CDS10 
 
Best Vs. 
AR FRB 
 
Best Vs. 
AR PAR 
 
Best Vs. BR BARA 
 
Best Vs. 
BR BRAD 
Best Vs. 
MX BRAD 
Best Vs. 
MX CET 
 
Floating Argentina 1/49 CDS 2  
(60.52) N/A -9.23 -12.78** -44.21*** -39.54*** -30.10*** -33.80*** -45.19*** -46.05*** 
11 Argentina 10/06 CDS 10 
(51.03) -30.80*** -29.92*** N/A -40.34*** -35.76*** -30.43*** -30.50*** -43.47*** -44.27*** 
11.75 Argentina 7/09 CDS 5 
(50.30) -7.19 N/A -3.09 -30.22*** -29.65*** -19.24*** -22.43*** -35.32*** -36.40*** 
11.375 Argentina 1/17 CDS 5 
(47.42) -8.27 N/A -6.60 -23.69*** -27.70*** -16.08*** -24.35*** -33.46*** -34.78*** 
Floating Brazil 4/12 CDS 10 
(56.49) -34.62*** -32.68*** N/A -41.81*** -39.94*** -11.27** -30.13*** -44.64*** -49.81*** 
11.625 Brazil 4/04 CDS 10 
(55.77) -11.63** -19.17*** N/A -37.47*** -32.29*** -14.43*** -19.70*** -36.51*** -40.59*** 
14.50 Brazil 10/09 CDS 10 
(63.45) -26.61*** -27.69*** N/A -42.17*** -39.13*** -16.12*** -29.23*** -43.56*** -49.04*** 
9.75 Mexico 4/05 CDS 5 
(35.56) -13.92*** N/A -18.26*** -25.28*** -21.88*** -17.01*** -25.36*** -12.58** -34.10*** 
9.875 Mexico 1/07 CDS 5 
(37.55) -17.68*** N/A -8.80 -28.21*** -23.84*** -16.52*** -28.00*** -15.02*** -36.19*** 
11.375 Mexico 9/16 CDS 10 
(33.52) -13.33*** -3.92 N/A -22.45*** -16.40*** -3.41 -18.61*** -9.10 -32.73*** 
Float Venezuela 12/07 CDS 2 
(23.46) N/A -25.06*** -25.59*** -20.36*** -15.35*** -4.76 -14.62*** -19.40*** -32.89*** 
13.625 Venezuela 8/18 BR BARA 
(9.26) -2.05 -16.10*** -15.66*** -15.54*** -7.85 N/A -10.97** -11.83** -13.96*** 
***Significant at the 1% level, Critical Value (CV) 12.8, **Significant at the 5% level, CV 9.8, both for 400 degrees of freedom
Table 5 (b) 
This table shows the results of the out of sample hedge effectiveness test as measured by the correlation test for the first half of the sample period, 
from February 2, 2000 to November 9, 2000. The first data column reports the most effective hedging instrument and its protection ratio P. All 
other data cells are the correlation between the sum and the difference in hedging errors of the most effective hedging instrument and the alternative 
hedging instrument. All data is in percent. The hedging instruments are the two year CDS, CDS 2, five year CDS, CDS 5, ten year CDS, CDS 10, 
Argentina Floating Rate Brady bond futures, AR FRB, Argentina Par Brady bond futures, AR PAR, Brazil BARRA Brady futures, BR Bara, Brazil 
EI Brady bond futures, BR Brad, Mexico Brady bond futures MX Brad and Mexico CETAS bond futures, MX CET. 
Instrument (coupon, issuer, 
maturity) 
Best Hedge 
(PR) 
Best Vs. 
CDS2 
Best Vs. 
CDS5 
Best Vs. 
CDS10 
 
Best Vs. 
AR FRB 
 
Best Vs. 
AR PAR 
 
Best Vs. BR 
BARA 
 
Best Vs. 
BR BRAD 
Best Vs. 
MX BRAD 
Best Vs. 
MX CET 
 
Floating Argentina 1/49 CDS 2 
(61.82) N/A -14.45** -15.14** -47.20*** -41.85*** -31.85*** -35.28*** -46.69*** -47.23*** 
11 Argentina 10/06 CDS 10 
(52.89) -33.20*** -33.42*** N/A -43.14*** -38.40*** -31.47*** -31.35*** -45.43*** -45.70*** 
11.75 Argentina 7/09 CDS 2 
(50.03) N/A -1.42 -2.47 -32.51*** -31.84*** -19.17*** -21.96*** -35.72*** -36.18*** 
11.375 Argentina 1/17 CDS 2 
(48.48) N/A -0.83 -4.55 -27.62*** -31.26*** -17.10** -24.53*** -33.45*** -33.80*** 
Floating Brazil 4/12 CDS 10 
(64.32) -26.20*** -5.11 N/A -55.07*** -51.20*** -24.86*** -40.25*** -55.86*** -57.83*** 
11.625 Brazil 4/04 CDS 5 
(66.64) -0.72 N/A -29.42*** -53.32*** -47.25*** -30.26*** -35.35*** -51.87*** -53.34*** 
14.50 Brazil 10/09 CDS 5 
(72.85) -19.11*** N/A -12.96 -59.05*** -55.90*** -36.36*** -46.98*** -58.91*** -62.31*** 
9.75 Mexico 4/05 BR BARA 
(6.42) -3.28 -2.72 0.66 -22.71*** -4.37 N/A -1.39 -4.33 -8.44 
9.875 Mexico 1/07 BR BARA 
(20.81) -12.38 -0.48 -0.05 -29.23*** -14.80** N/A -14.32 -10.92 -19.91*** 
11.375 Mexico 9/16 CDS 10 
(27.06) -8.39 -1.24 N/A -27.94*** -19.88*** -3.40 -13.56 -19.34*** -25.88*** 
Float Venezuela 12/07 CDS 10 
(34.91) -7.89 -17.81** N/A -38.05*** -28.27*** -17.88** -27.44*** -34.22*** -39.22*** 
13.625 Venezuela 8/18 CDS 2 
(22.97) N/A -17.37** -23.34*** -24.52*** -16.27** -6.18 -15.69** -24.54*** -32.37*** 
***Significant at the 1% level, Critical Value (CV) 18.1, **Significant at the 5% level, CV 13.8, both for 200 degrees of freedom
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Table 5 (c) 
This table shows the results of the out of sample hedge effectiveness test as measured by the correlation test for the first half of the sample period, from 
November 10, 2000 to August 17, 2000. The first data column reports the most effective hedging instrument and its protection ratio P. All other data 
cells are the correlation between the sum and the difference in hedging errors of the most effective hedging instrument and the alternative hedging 
instrument. All data is in percent. The hedging instruments are the two year CDS, CDS 2, five year CDS, CDS 5, ten year CDS, CDS 10, Argentina 
Floating Rate Brady bond futures, AR FRB, Argentina Par Brady bond futures, AR PAR, Brazil BARRA Brady futures, BR Barra, Brazil EI Brady bond 
futures, BR Brad, Mexico Brady bond futures MX Brad and Mexico CETAS bond futures, MX CET. 
Instrument (coupon, issuer, 
maturity) 
Best Hedge 
(PR) 
Best Vs. 
CDS2 
Best Vs. 
CDS5 
Best Vs. 
CDS10 
 
Best Vs. 
AR FRB 
 
Best Vs. 
AR PAR 
 
Best Vs. BR 
BARA 
 
Best Vs. 
BR BRAD 
Best Vs. 
MX BRAD 
Best Vs. 
MX CET 
 
Floating Argentina 1/49 CDS 2 
(61.82) N/A -14.45** -15.14** -47.20*** -41.85*** -31.85*** -35.28*** -46.69*** -47.23*** 
11 Argentina 10/06 CDS 10 
(52.89) -33.20*** -33.42*** N/A -43.14*** -38.40*** -31.47*** -31.35*** -45.43*** -45.70*** 
11.75 Argentina 7/09 CDS 2 
(50.03) N/A -1.42 -2.47 -32.51*** -31.84*** -19.17*** -21.96*** -35.72*** -36.18*** 
11.375 Argentina 1/17 CDS 2 
(48.48) N/A -0.83 -4.55 -27.62*** -31.26*** -17.10** -24.53*** -33.45*** -33.80*** 
Floating Brazil 4/12 CDS 10 
(64.32) -26.20*** -5.11 N/A -55.07*** -51.20*** -24.86*** -40.25*** -55.86*** -57.83*** 
11.625 Brazil 4/04 CDS 5 
(66.64) -0.72 N/A -29.42*** -53.32*** -47.25*** -30.26*** -35.35*** -51.87*** -53.34*** 
14.50 Brazil 10/09 CDS 5 
(72.85) -19.11*** N/A -12.96 -59.05*** -55.90*** -36.36*** -46.98*** -58.91*** -62.31*** 
9.75 Mexico 4/05 BR BARA 
(6.42) -3.28 -2.72 0.66 -22.71*** -4.37 N/A -1.39 -4.33 -8.44 
9.875 Mexico 1/07 BR BARA 
(20.81) -12.38 -0.48 -0.05 -29.23*** -14.80** N/A -14.32 -10.92 -19.91*** 
11.375 Mexico 9/16 CDS 10 
(27.06) -8.39 -1.24 N/A -27.94*** -19.88*** -3.40 -13.56 -19.34*** -25.88*** 
Float Venezuela 12/07 CDS 10 
(34.91) -7.89 -17.81** N/A -38.05*** -28.27*** -17.88** -27.44*** -34.22*** -39.22*** 
13.625 Venezuela 8/18 CDS 2 
(22.97) N/A -17.37** -23.34*** -24.52*** -16.27** -6.18 -15.69** -24.54*** -32.37*** 
***Significant at the 1% level, Critical Value (CV) 18.1, **Significant at the 5% level, CV 13.8, both for 200 degrees of freedom 
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1
 For further details see Http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brady_bonds. 
2
 We did not include bonds from other Latin American emerging market countries as they were 
infrequently traded. 
3
 The hedging performance of the T-Note futures, the one-month LIBOR and the S&P 500 futures 
contracts are available from the corresponding author upon request. 
4
 We did not regress Mexican bond price changes against changes in the price of the Mexico Brady 
bond futures contract because this futures contract enjoyed four distinct periods of trading/no trading 
periods. Therefore it is difficult to compare regression performance in trading as opposed to non-
trading periods, thereby defeating the purpose of the exercise. 
5
 The graphs from this exercise are not included in the paper for the sake of brevity. They are available 
from the corresponding author upon request. Also, why we chose August 17, 2001 to end this exercise 
is explained later. 
6
 A leading investment bank that wishes to remain anonymous provides the CDS data. 
7
 See Snedecor and Cochran (1989), page 192 for details. 
